import { readHashParams } from "./remote.ts";
const CONNECT_AUTH_STATE_PARAM = "state";
const CONNECT_AUTH_CHALLENGE_PARAM = "challenge";
const CONNECT_AUTH_PORT_PARAM = "port";
const CONNECT_AUTH_CODE_SEPARATOR = ".";
const CONNECT_LOOPBACK_CALLBACK_PATH = "/callback";
const CONNECT_AUTHORIZE_PATH = "/connect";
const CONNECT_CALLBACK_PATH = "/connect/callback";
/**
* The CLI prints URLs against this origin and the web bundle uses it to
* decide whether it is the hosted deployment — the two must agree, so the
* default lives here.
*/
export const DEFAULT_HOSTED_APP_URL = "https://app.t3.codes";
/**
* Requested at authorize time by the hosted page and honored by the CLI's
* token exchange; keep both sides on this single definition.
*/
export const CONNECT_OAUTH_SCOPES = ["openid", "profile", "email"] as const;
export interface ConnectAuthorizeRequest {
readonly state: string;
readonly challenge: string;
/**
* Present when a loopback CLI initiated the request: the hosted /connect
* page then asks Clerk to redirect the authorization code straight to
* `http://127.0.0.1:<port>/callback` instead of the hosted callback page.
*/
readonly loopbackPort?: number;
}
/**
* The URL the CLI prints for the user to open in a browser. `state` and
* `code_challenge` ride the fragment so they never reach the hosted app's
* server or CDN logs; neither is a secret.
*
* Both CLI flows route through the hosted /connect page rather than hitting
* Clerk's /oauth/authorize directly: a signed-out browser sent straight to
* /oauth/authorize goes through Clerk's sign-in redirect, which does not
* reliably preserve the authorize query parameters (state, response_type,
* code_challenge). The hosted page waits for a Clerk session first, then
* forwards the request with the parameters intact.
*/
export function buildConnectAuthorizeRequestUrl(input: {
readonly hostedAppUrl: string;
readonly state: string;
readonly challenge: string;
readonly loopbackPort?: number;
}): string {
const url = new URL(CONNECT_AUTHORIZE_PATH, input.hostedAppUrl);
url.hash = new URLSearchParams([
[CONNECT_AUTH_STATE_PARAM, input.state],
[CONNECT_AUTH_CHALLENGE_PARAM, input.challenge],
...(input.loopbackPort === undefined
? []
: [[CONNECT_AUTH_PORT_PARAM, String(input.loopbackPort)] as [string, string]]),
]).toString();
return url.toString();
}
export function readConnectAuthorizeRequest(url: URL): ConnectAuthorizeRequest | null {
const params = readHashParams(url);
const state = params.get(CONNECT_AUTH_STATE_PARAM)?.trim() ?? "";
const challenge = params.get(CONNECT_AUTH_CHALLENGE_PARAM)?.trim() ?? "";
if (!state || !challenge) {
return null;
}
const port = params.get(CONNECT_AUTH_PORT_PARAM);
if (port === null) {
return { state, challenge };
}
// A present-but-invalid port means the link was corrupted; reject the whole
// request rather than silently downgrading a loopback flow to the
// out-of-band one, which would strand the waiting CLI.
const loopbackPort = parseLoopbackPort(port.trim());
if (loopbackPort === null) {
return null;
}
return { state, challenge, loopbackPort };
}
function parseLoopbackPort(value: string): number | null {
if (!/^\d{1,5}$/.test(value)) {
return null;
}
const port = Number(value);
return port >= 1 && port <= 65535 ? port : null;
}
/**
* Redirect URI for the CLI's local callback listener. Must stay in sync with
* the redirect URI registered on the Clerk CLI OAuth application.
*/
export function connectLoopbackRedirectUri(port: number): string {
return `http://127.0.0.1:${port}${CONNECT_LOOPBACK_CALLBACK_PATH}`;
}
export function connectCallbackUrl(hostedAppUrl: string): string {
return new URL(CONNECT_CALLBACK_PATH, hostedAppUrl).toString();
}
export function buildConnectClerkAuthorizeUrl(input: {
readonly authorizationEndpoint: string;
readonly clientId: string;
readonly redirectUri: string;
readonly scopes: ReadonlyArray<string>;
readonly state: string;
readonly challenge: string;
}): string {
const url = new URL(input.authorizationEndpoint);
url.searchParams.set("client_id", input.clientId);
url.searchParams.set("redirect_uri", input.redirectUri);
url.searchParams.set("response_type", "code");
url.searchParams.set("scope", input.scopes.join(" "));
url.searchParams.set("state", input.state);
url.searchParams.set("code_challenge", input.challenge);
url.searchParams.set("code_challenge_method", "S256");
return url.toString();
}
export interface ConnectAuthCode {
readonly code: string;
readonly state: string;
}
/**
* The single blob the hosted callback page displays and the CLI accepts.
* Bundling `state` with the authorization code lets the CLI keep the loopback
* flow's CSRF check without any backend: it verifies the returned state
* matches the one it generated. Clerk authorization codes and the CLI's
* base64url states never contain ".".
*/
export function encodeConnectAuthCode(input: ConnectAuthCode): string {
return `${input.code}${CONNECT_AUTH_CODE_SEPARATOR}${input.state}`;
}
/**
* Validates an out-of-band authorization code against the state of the request this process
* generated. Returns the parsed code or a user-facing error message; both
* the prompt's live validation and the authoritative post-prompt check go
* through here so they cannot drift.
*/
export function checkConnectAuthCode(
blob: string,
expectedState: string,
): ConnectAuthCode | string {
const parsed = parseConnectAuthCode(blob);
if (parsed === null) {
return "That does not look like a T3 Connect code. Copy the full code.";
}
if (parsed.state !== expectedState) {
return "That code belongs to a different connect request. Open the URL above and try again.";
}
return parsed;
}
export function parseConnectAuthCode(blob: string): ConnectAuthCode | null {
const trimmed = blob.trim();
const separatorIndex = trimmed.lastIndexOf(CONNECT_AUTH_CODE_SEPARATOR);
if (separatorIndex <= 0 || separatorIndex === trimmed.length - 1) {
return null;
}
const code = trimmed.slice(0, separatorIndex);
const state = trimmed.slice(separatorIndex + 1);
return { code, state };
}